Time travel

"Change alone is eternal, perpetual, immortal."

~ Arthur Schopenhauer

 

 

We'd talked yesterday about identity, and how fractured a thing that is. We considered primarily the intersubjective entity - the word, the symbol, the representation of the objective in discourse. Today we're going to look more at the objective entity itself, the Dasein, as we move from a consideration of self-referentiality to infinite recursion.

 

What do we mean by Dasein? The term comes to us from Martin Heidegger, and it literally means "being there." As opposed to simply "being," it denotes being in a particular place - which, for a dynamic entity in a dynamic universe, entails being also at a particular time. A "being," particularly the abstract "being" that we draw upon in discourse, does not have a necessary relation to any other being; the Dasein exists in the context of other entities in time and space. It has coordinates. In an important sense, the Dasein gives meaning to Time and Space - we understand both indirectly by the changes entities undergo through dimensions of time and space. Our consciousness of space is perhaps more direct: our proprioceptive sense tells us how our physical body is oriented in space, and gives us some idea of its relative propinquity to other physical bodies. Our sense of time passing is not as direct, and in fact the naive view of Time as a river flowing from past through present into future can limit our worldview in important ways despite being the most straightforward way to interpret our impressions of the empirical world.

 

Borges, in Funes el memorioso, describes a remarkable character blessed (or cursed) with absolutely perfect recall. This individual's unique worldview creates for him a difficulty with identity - his recall is so perfect that he can recall every single instant of his subjective existence with crystal clarity. He does not need to reference an abstract intersubjective as a placeholder for the vague recollection that must suffice for most of us. He remembers every single instant of perception as its own unique set of entities - the bed or the book or the tree that he saw this morning is, for him, isolated from every other perception of what we would see as "the same" bed or book or tree. Number has no meaning for him; defying arithmetic, he invents his own number system in which each number has its own idiosyncratic name (the number five hundred in his system is known as nine, for example). It may seem that Borges invents Funes merely as a device to investigate the assumptions that underlie our perception of the world; in fact, the neuropsychologist Alexander Luria describes a real-life case with striking similarities, and there are perhaps a dozen such cases in the literature of brain science.

 

There are obviously good reasons to assume that Time does indeed flow in a linear fashion from Past to Future; that our naive impressions are accurate depictions of an empirically real world in which physical entities interact in predictable and measurable ways. Centuries of scientific experiment support this view; but it's worth remembering that the assumptions underpinning science, the axioms of science, predispose us to accept certain sorts of evidence. Inductive reasoning - the scientific habit of extrapolating from known patterns exhibited in the past to predicted patterns expected in the future - suffers from this problem, as David Hume noted: there is no good reason to believe that some relation which has been demonstrated between entities in the past will continue to be demonstrated in the future. One pithy formulation of this is the observation that we can't know that the Sun will rise tomorrow, just because it did today and yesterday and every day before. We can produce all sorts of scientific arguments why it should, but all of those arguments rest on inductive reasoning as well. We must accept axioms on faith, in science as in any system of thought. In fact, an axiom is necessarily not provable within the logic it supports (this isn't Godelian Incompleteness, however; this is a fundamental question of knowability, and one we'll look at later in the company of Fitch and Gettier, among others).

 

If Time is somehow other than linear; if it is, for example, a continuous dimension in which all events we perceive as consecutive are actually simultaneous - if, going one step further, it is a fractal dimension in which all possible events, perceived and unperceived, are simultaneous - then our assumptions about its passing and our motion through it are flawed. The limits of our experience of Time are revealed as precisely that: limits of our experience, and not of Time itself. Paradoxes of infinite recursion encourage us to visualize alternative models of Time that resolve or obviate the paradox - but that we are discussing in another metanow...

To be or not to be, that is the question

“Quantum theory also tells us that the world is not simply objective;
somehow it’s something more subtle than that.” ~ John Polkinghorne

 

Although it is the beginning, it's not the sense in which we ordinarily - naively - think of things existing. We think of a thing existing in a measurable way; we think of it having physical properties like weight and dimension and color. This is objective existence, and it is different in important ways from subjective existence. One of these is that an objectively real entity is directly accessible to multiple observers. A mountain is, objectively, a mountain which can be observed independently by many people. Furthermore, an objectively real entity does not exist because it is observed (Berkeley is coughing pointedly, but let us ignore him for now); indeed, it exists even when it is not observed. Unlike a subjective entity, the objective entity has an independent existence of its own. It is the independence of objectivity, and the empirical evidence of our physical selves as such independent objective entities, that gives rise to the awareness of self qua self without which subjective existence were impossible.

If you accept that, you can also accept that objectivity exists a priori to subjectivity; the subjective analogue to an objective entity arises out of the process of observing that objective entity with a physical sensorium. There is a very interesting problem in empiricism, encapsulated by the philosopher David Hume when he posed the question: can we imagine a shade of blue we have never directly perceived? Hume differentiated between 'impressions' that are subjective entities triggered by or derived from the objective world around us, and 'ideas' that are subjective entities generated without reference to the objective reality in which we physically exist. Whether we can apprehend an idea of blue that is sui generis, and not merely an impression unconsciously remembered, remains a dilemma for empiricists. For our purposes right now, it is sufficient to state that all of us can readily understand both subjective and objective existence, and further that we can understand they are qualitatively different kinds of existence.

Because of the fuzzy skepticism of Descartes, it is not always possible to state definitively of any particular entity of which we are consciously aware that it is either subjective or objective; and this is another sort of problem, addressed by Borges in his Argumentum Ornithologicum. Nevertheless, we have at this point identified two ways in which a thing may be; and, at least theoretically, we have established that these ways of being are not necessarily universal - that is, some entity may 'be' only subjectively, or only objectively, although it may well exist in both ways and it can exist in both ways so homogenously as to blur the line between the two.

That is already quite some philosophical ground we've covered, but this is the point where we return to Korzybski and the metanow (which is not a Korzybskian construct, but which relates to his time-binding notion very handily). We do so by considering an entirely different kind of existence. We do so by considering words.

Ars gratia artis

“Art is the lie that enables us to realize the truth”
~ Pablo Picasso

 

While I'm still being pretentious, let me talk a moment about what I think it means for art to be made. One can, with only a little exercise of the imagination, picture a rock formation which is a perfect or near-perfect analogue of some abstract sculpture - perhaps by Henry Moore - and then pose oneself the question: which of these is Art? We can skirt Paley and assume that the rock formation is not a 'made thing' in the sense of being the product of willed agency; we might then conclude that the sculpture is Art, while the rock formation is not, because of the artist. From that point, we can then, with only a very tiny further exertion of our imagination, conceive of a grilled-cheese sandwich, likewise made by the willed agency of that same Henry Moore, and assert that this would not be Art. This assertion would not necessarily invalidate our thesis; we could evolve it slightly to suggest that what makes an artwork is the willed intention of the artist to make Art. This concept achieves its apotheosis in the artist who makes Art simply by declaring of something that pre-existed that it has become Art - a clarifying elaboration of this concept actually won a Turner Prize for the artist Simon Starling a few years back, and will again be something to which we return (assuming, as I must no less than I assume your existence reading this in the metanow, that you are still with me when Starling reappears in this narrative). We could make different assertions concerning rock and sculpture and sandwich - we could imagine an aesthetic in which only the sandwich were Art, or in which none of these things were Art - and there might indeed be some profit in following these alternative aesthetics to their conclusion (and you can find counterparts to Starling for any of them, from Chris Ofili to Tracey Emin to Andres Serrano). But I will advance here, without at this point providing anything substantive by way of justification, the argument that Art is made by the intuition of the Artist in the eye of the Observer.

To really elaborate on that it's necessary to return to an earlier, and similarly unsupported, argument: I can only be, I said, without troubling to define any of those terms. I'm now going to embark on one of the more foolhardy quests available to the philosopher, and examine what I understand being to ... be. In doing so, I make no presumption of authority, nor even of adequacy to the task. I simply intend to express, to my own satisfaction and with my own nebulous appreciation of the broader form of my expression as a whole, what it may be to be a being: in what senses some entity may be understood to be.